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1. Canada's Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis

1.1. Diefenbaker believed it was Kennedy's arrogance that led and endangered North America and could have led to nuclear war. It was no secret that the Prime Minister and the President hated each other during their terms in office.

1.2. Diefenbaker refused to put Canadian troops on alert to DEFCON 3 as Kennedy had requested.

1.3. Diefenbaker only put troops on alert after all other Nato members supported a proposed blockade and agreed to aid the US if an attack occurred. Diefenbaker acted after the crisis climax had passed.

1.4. Prime Minister Diefenbaker first doubted the intelligence he was provided by President Kennedy, and asked ofr more photographs of the missile sites. he also wanted independent U.N. inspectors to go to Cuba and survey for nuclear sites. Kennedy said that there was no time for this.

2. Against

2.1. 15,000 Avro employees lost their jobs abruptly and another 15,000 people in the aeropspace supply chain industry lost their jobs in the near term due to the Arvo Arrow cancellation.

2.1.1. The United States military certainly didn't expect the Arrow program to be scrapped, and more importantly it didn't want the Avro Arrow and its designs to fall into the wrong hands. Interestingly enough, there is strong evidence now to show that blue prints and one prototype Arrow did survive scrapping and did find its way into the US military. The Arrow (CF-105) uncanny similarity to US jets of the decades to come, the F-16 and especially the F-18 demonstrate the high likihood that the US took designs and technologies from the Arrow and incorporated them into their own jets. The Avro Arrow had come to symbolize both the potential and unfulfilled promise of Canadian innovation. As a result its scrapping, it totally devated the Canadian aeorspace industry. Many of the scientists and engineers of Avro Canada went on to work for NASA in the years following the scrapping the Arrow program demonstrating the cutting edge technology that Canada and a great loss in this area for our nation.

3. For

4. The Scrapping of the Avro Arrow

4.1. Diefenbaker claimed that the Avro Arrow CF-105) was too expensive and was no longer worth the money. The Avro company was going through millions of taxpayer dollars--400 million and counting, and still the weapons were not decided on. It was estimated it would cost about one billion, a huge amount of money for the late 1950s.

4.1.1. The Avro Arrow was designed as a long-range interceptor of Soviet bombers carrying nuclear war-heads. However, just when the Arrow was rolling into production there was a huge shift from long range bombers to intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the late 1950s the Soviets successfully launched the Sputnik satellite which demonstrated the technology of long range rockets and their potential to carry nuclear war-heads. The RCMP confirmed that a Soviet "mole"had infiltrated the Avro Canada company and was about to smuggle out the blue prints of the Arrow. It was decided by the government in the interest of security to destroy the planes and the blue prints immediately. It was hoped that the enormous cost overuns of the Avro Arrow would be offset by selling the planes to Allied nations, like the United States, England and France. However, there was no interest. Because of the enormous size of these jets and their single purpose of shooting down bombers, they did not suit the purpose of European air forces. The Avro Arrow wasn't even designed to carry a gun to shoot down enemy fighters, only missiles. THE ARROW, James Dow, J. Lorimer press, 1979: the definitive work. FALL OF AN ARROW, Murray Peden, Canada's Wings, 1978. SHUTTING DOWN THE NATIONAL DREAM, Greig Stewart, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1988. THERE NEVER WAS AN ARROW, E.K. Shaw, Steel Rail Educational, 1981.

5. For

5.1. The Canadian Press was very supportive of the American President and very harsh to the lack of support of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. The Globe and Mail in 1963 wrote a "devastating editorial attacking Diefenbaker for his half-hearted support of President Kennedy. It said his attempt to sit on the fence and avoid direct commitment and support was a rebuke to the United States, which at this time of crisis was unthinkable.

5.2. The Canadian military showed strong support for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even when Prime Minister John Diefenbaker refused to go the DEFCON 3, as requested by President Kennedy, military commanders in Canada were putting their soldiers through military exercises that mirrored the same protocol as this military alert The Canadian army and air-force were standing up to maximum alert without political approval. (page 99)

5.3. The Canadian navy played a very large role in the Cuban Missile crisis, particularly our anti-submarine fleet. The Russians during this period used fishing boats for surveillance and had overa dozen submarines off the coast of the Maritimes and the Eastern US seaboard. These submarines had to be kept in close watch as the 60 vessel US fleet kept their blockade around Cuba. It was the Canadian navy and the US navy that were the only two branches of the military that worked together smoothly during this crisis.

6. Canada's Acceptance of Nuclear Weapons in 1963.

6.1. People felt that by giving up on the Arrow project, we were effectively destroying Canadian innovation for the sake of convenience and supporting American industry.

6.2. Many feared that this would result in contributing to global suicide. Paranoia was rampant.

6.3. Diefenbaker's Cabinet was very divided on the issue and spread an image that the Conservatives lacked solidarity. Due to the revolt on the issue, the Diefenbaker government was forced to call an election, and was replaced with a Lester B. Pearson's minority Liberal government.

6.4. Foreign Affairs Minister Howard Green felt that to accept nuclear weapons in Canada was hypocritical and against foreign policy, as our involvements with the United Nations were striving towards global disarmament. Many Canadian citizens felt the same way.

7. Against

8. For

8.1. A majority of Canadian citizens were sympathetic and supportive to President Kennedy and the American struggle people's struggle to blockade Soviet ships from bringing nuclear weapons to Cuba. It was understood by most Canadians that America's problem and enemy--Russia and Communism, was also ours.

8.2. Created a sense of security for many Canadians, knowing that we had some sort of defense mechanism was in place against Soviet attacks. For many Canadians a nuclear attack was not a matter of if, it was a matter or when.

8.3. Established a united front with USA, not only with NORAD, but any actions considered to be Anti-American would have been costly to international relations and trade.

8.4. Arrow project was too expensive and ineffective at meeting Canada's security needs. Bomarc missiles were a more reasonable route, but would be ineffectual without the use of nuclear war heads.

8.5. American Bomarc missles would have been placed at missile sites along the Canadian border which would have downed any incoming Soviet bombers over vulnerable Canadian civilian areas. By moving missile sites to more northern Canadian locations, any downed aircraft or missiles would (hopefully) be far away from civilization.

9. Against