Power/Change

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Power/Change by Mind Map: Power/Change

1. Access/Distributions

1.1. Elite

1.1.1. Economic Elite Domination

1.1.1.1. Domhoff

1.1.1.1.1. Intersection of Corporate Community/Social Upper Class/Policy-Planning Network

1.1.1.2. Mills

1.1.1.2.1. Power-Elite

1.1.1.3. Gilens & Page 2014

1.1.2. Biased (Business-Oriented) Pluralism

1.1.2.1. Gilens & Page 2014

1.1.3. Hacker & Pierson 2010

1.1.3.1. 1) hyper-concentration of income, 2) sustained concentration, and 3) few trickle down effects suggest policy drift occurring in taxation, industrial relations, executive compensation, and market deregulation created a winner take all economy

1.1.3.1.1. Economic explanations focus on skill based technological change but education is more broadly distributed than income/wealth and winner take all is a very recent development

1.2. Pluralist

1.2.1. Pluralism/ Majoritarian Electoral Democracy

1.2.1.1. Dahl

1.2.1.1.1. Polyarchy

1.2.1.2. See Social Movements / Electoral / Public Policy & Opinion

1.2.2. Majoritarian (Mass-Based) Pluralism

1.2.2.1. Gilens & Page 2014

2. The State

2.1. State Formation/Transition

2.1.1. Rational Choice Theory

2.1.1.1. Adams's Critique

2.1.1.1.1. Institutionalized culture patterns in rational choice theories are overlooked which not only shape rulers' end/values but also who counts as a ruler and how the social world is classified. Examples include emotion in patrimonial rulers lineage (honor/reputation) when shifts in incentives.info/resources fail to change rulers behavior as maintaining political family foothold is prioritized. Struturing states around family culture (familial states) explains symbolic politics (French Revolution)

2.1.2. Revolutions

2.1.2.1. Causes/Mechanisms of Revolution

2.1.2.1.1. Three Sociological Explanations (Goodwin)

2.1.2.1.2. Scott 1977

2.1.3. Nationalism

2.1.3.1. Anderson

2.1.3.1.1. Imagined Community

2.1.4. Tilly

2.1.4.1. State formation how an autonomous bureaucratic field with its own logic and capital or raison d’état emerged following four stages of processes:

2.1.4.1.1. 1) concentration of coercion/ info(culture)/ economic/ symbolic( juridical) capital types,

2.1.4.1.2. 2) the formation of dynastic-patrimonial royalty (monopolization of monopoly by nobility)

2.1.4.1.3. 3) a statist shift as autocrat power differentiates/diffuses

2.1.4.1.4. 4) shift from bureaucratic state to welfare state

2.1.5. Bourdieu 1994

2.2. The Role of the State

2.2.1. As an Actor/Tool

2.2.1.1. Creating/Maintain Stratification

2.2.1.1.1. Marxist (Jessop)

2.2.1.1.2. James & Redding

2.2.1.1.3. Esping-Andersen's Power Resource Analyst (Orloff)

2.2.1.1.4. Hobson 2005

2.2.1.2. Creating Compliance/Submission

2.2.1.2.1. Bourdieu 1994

2.2.1.2.2. Foucault 1991

2.2.2. As a Political Arena

2.2.2.1. Fligstein & McAdam

2.2.2.1.1. Fields Dominated by Incumbents and Challengers

2.2.3. Other Views

2.2.3.1. Durkheim

2.2.3.1.1. For Durkheim, the state was above all an ‘organ of social thought’ elaborating definite representations for the collectivity: ‘the special organ whose responsibility it is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collectivity’

2.2.3.2. Marxists

2.2.3.2.1. Marxists have been more concerned with the economic functions of the state as a relation of production, distinguishing between its ideological appearance as serving the general interests of society as a whole, and its essential relations that function to promote the specific needs of the bourgeoisie.

2.2.3.3. Weber

2.2.3.3.1. For Weber the state was able to claim a monopoly of legitimate violence with the aid of a regularised administrative staff as well as a paid army over a delimited territorial area.

3. Social Movements

3.1. Social movements are influences by Public Opinion -Burstein

3.2. Meyer/Tarrow's Social Movement Society

3.2.1. Caren, Ghoshal & Ribas 2011

3.2.2. Dodson 2011

3.3. lasting change McVeigh, Cuningham & Farrel 2014

3.4. Movement Mobilization

3.4.1. (Classical) Relative Deprivation/Discontent

3.4.1.1. masses of isolated anomic individuals seeking socio-psychological security and the primacy of social strain/stress in motivating movements

3.4.2. Resource Mobilization

3.4.2.1. Mass base of (virtually impotent/powerless) people derive strength from resources provided by elite funding sources to engage

3.4.3. Political Process (Insurgency Theory)

3.4.3.1. McAdam 1999

3.4.3.1.1. The structure of political power brings changes by the insurgent group itself (including ministers, teachers, students etc.)

3.4.3.1.2. Three (necessary) Factors:

3.4.4. Contentious Politics

3.4.4.1. Tilly & Tarrow 2015

3.4.4.2. Tarrow 2011

3.4.5. Framing

3.4.5.1. Benford & Snow 2000

3.4.5.1.1. Collective Action Frames

3.4.5.1.2. Framing Processes and Dynamics

3.4.5.1.3. Effects & Consequences of Framing Processes - The Implications Sets regarding:

3.4.5.1.4. Contextual Constraints & Facilitation

4. Electoral

4.1. Participation

4.1.1. Social Bases/Cleavages

4.1.1.1. Columbia School/ Social Bases of Political Behavior

4.1.1.1.1. Lazersfeld

4.1.1.1.2. Lipset (& Rokkan)

4.1.1.2. Manza & Brooks 1999

4.1.1.2.1. Despite claims, social cleavages in race, religion, class, and gender are still and increasingly important

4.1.2. Michigan School/ Social-Psychological Approach- Controlled NES

4.1.2.1. Campbell, Converse, etc

4.1.2.1.1. General theory of voting with the funnel of causality that places sociological elements at the furthest/wide end and psychological at the nearest/narrow end to vote choice,

4.1.2.2. Miller & Shanks

4.1.2.2.1. Revived with 6 levels of causality (socioeconomic/partisan & policy/economic assessments/candidate & partisan evaluations) each being influenced but not effecting prior factors, and they note attitudinal shifts as explained by generational and socialization differences

4.1.3. Rational Choice/ Economic Models

4.1.3.1. Downs

4.1.3.1.1. Focused on the expected utility of choices offered by candidates/parties making it a Rational Choice model where groups are aggregates of self-interested actors voting for parties perceived to provide the most benefit attempting to explain class based on left/right demands for a greater share.

4.1.4. Group Affect Models

4.1.4.1. Merton (Stouffer)

4.1.4.1.1. General reference group theory positing multiple overlapping positive and negative reference groups distinguishing individual and group-based reference categories.

4.1.4.2. Group Affect Models emphasize subjective identification/group consciousness; as a social-psychological thesis it refines social group beyond objective group membership (of the Michigan Model) toward subjective degree of identification and positive affect toward a (reference) group.

4.1.4.2.1. Without a subjective component objective membership is expected to be less influential.

4.2. Political Parties

4.2.1. Endogenous Instrumental Tools

4.2.1.1. Aldrich

4.2.1.1.1. Parties are endogenous institutions that serve as tools to be used by politicians for their own (not necessarily partisan) purposes

4.2.2. Lipset & Rokkan 1967

4.2.2.1. Certain cleavages define how parties form, and the emergence of enduring party systems has to do with the sequencing of the “national” and industrial revolutions in each state

4.2.2.1.1. Two Major Axes of Social Division

4.2.2.1.2. Four Thresholds are used to conceptualize regime type:

5. Public Policy & Opinion

5.1. Institutional/Policy Change

5.1.1. Hacker 2005

5.1.1.1. Mismatch/disjuncture between traditional structures of social provision and new sorts of social risks is rooted in the institutional resilience that protected against retrenchment

5.1.1.1.1. Rather than resulting from exogenous shock mismatch tends to occur as a direct outgrowth of often hidden second face of welfare debate (change through policies of stealth)

5.1.1.2. Processes of Chnage

5.1.1.2.1. Adaptation-conversion (refashioning institutions from within and without when institutions are malleable yet barriers block authoritative change)

5.1.1.2.2. Layering (new institutions are created alongside old ones when institutional structures are change resistant but political context is conducive)

5.1.1.2.3. Drift (advocates favor preventing updating institutions to changing circumstance when neither internal structures nor political contexts favor reform) - Change without major legislative reform

5.1.1.2.4. Elimination/Replacement

5.1.2. Streeck & Thelen 2005

5.1.3. Punctuated Equilibrium

5.1.3.1. Baumgarter & Jones 2009

5.2. Citizenship and Values

5.2.1. Almond, Verba, & Pye's Civic Culture

5.2.2. Dalton & Welzel 2015

5.2.3. Inglehart

6. Sources of Power/Legitmacy

6.1. Weber

6.1.1. Traditional

6.1.2. Charismatic

6.1.3. Routinization into

6.1.3.1. Rational Legal